The climax of the First Vatican Council came on July 18, 1870, when its participants assembled in St. Peter's Basilica for the solemn proclamation of Pastor aeternus, the Council's "first dogmatic constitution on the Church of Christ," 1 best known for its definition of the "infallible magisterium of the Roman pontiff." 2 Thomas Mozley, an Anglican clergyman and special correspondent for the London Times during the Council, described the event with Victorian verve:
the frustrated anti-infallibilist, the storm was a sign of divine displeasure over ecclesiastical presumption. In fact, the storm-tossed session climaxed many months of tumultuous debate, outside as well as within the Council. By the time of the final session, few opponents of the definition were still in Rome to entertain such musings. After protesting to the Pope both their reservations and their loyalty, most of the anti-infallibilist bishops left for their homes, rather than attend the solemn proclamation. 4 The storm might also be interpreted as prophetic. During the months following the conciliar declaration, the anguished debates were re-enacted on a personal level; gradually but reluctantly, the opposition bishops came around to accepting the definition. Most, but not all, Roman Catholics followed suit; a protest group eventually collected a modest number of adherents to form the Old Catholic Church.
5 Also, as predicted during the Council, the definition gave governments an excuse to interfere in ecclesiastical affairs; the Kulturkampf, for example, would probably have occurred without any incentive from Vatican I, but infallibility did provide a convenient incendiary. 6 Just as storms eventually abate, so the intramural controversy about infallibility dissipated during the decade after the Council. Indeed, the fact that the papacy in general and infallibility in particular were frequently under attack may have fostered its eventually unquestioned acceptance in Catholic circles after Vatican I until Vatican II. 7 This unchallenged acceptance still perdured at Vatican II, where the discussion focused not on infallibility but on collegiality; in effect, Vatican II extended the teaching of Vatican I by acknowledging the episcopal college as an agent of infallibility.
CENTENNIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
In the wake of the theological aggiornamento stimulated by Vatican II, it was inevitable that eventually there would be a reassessment of 4 infallibility. Theologically considered, infallibility is a doctrine that crosscuts many others: the nature of revelation, the personal appropriation of faith, the witness of tradition, the concept of dogma, the process of doctrinal development, the teaching office of the Church, etc. With each of these other topics undergoing re-examination and reformulation, there accumulated a series of implications that should necessitate collateral revisions in the doctrine of infallibility. For example, postconciliar theological renewal increasingly tended to consider revelation as a communicational phenomenon, while simultaneously rejecting an identification of revelation with (revealed) truths or propositions. Consequently, infallibility as a charism bestowed for the authentic presentation of revelation should not be identified with (infallible) truths or propositions.
While the ongoing revision in various areas of systematic theology would have logically forced an eventual reconsideration of infallibility, a number of factors hastened the process. First, the convocation of Vatican II stimulated considerable interest in its«predecessor in particular and in conciliar history in general. 9 The result was a steady stream of publications: on the history of general councils, such as Philip Hughes's The Church in Crisis; 10 existence of a few lacunae in the theological teaching of Vatican I. Secondly, not one of the seventeen essays in this volume was in English; presumably, the English-speaking world was minimally aware of the ongoing theological re-examination of Vatican I.
In contrast, the European theological reassessment of Vatican I was gaining momentum. One of the first monographs to appear was that of Gustave Thus, who studied the specific question of pontifical infallibility via a threefold approach: historical background, textual analysis, and theological elaboration. 15 While Thils's treatment may now seem conventional, its publication made a significant break with the manualist practice of interpreting texts in logical-legal fashion. More importantly, his theological presentation indicated some of the hermeneutical difficulties concerning infallibility and suggested possible solutions. Just as the volume of his Louvain colleague Aubert offered an excellent overview of the history of Vatican I, so Thils's work furnished a preliminary survey of the problem of infallibility.
A second factor stimulating theological discussion on infallibility was ecumenical dialogue. Immediately after Vatican II, ecumenically-minded theologians began discussing such topics of long-standing contention as Scripture and tradition, faith and justification, Eucharist and ministry. While all of these topics implicitly bordered on papacy and infallibility, an official consideration of these subjects was usually judged premature, not only because their treatment presupposed a yet-to-be-discussed ecclesiological framework, but also because these subjects still retained a good measure of polemical potential. 20 Simultaneously, Robert Murray, a Roman Catholic contributor, examined the ways in which one may legitimately use infallibility; Murray envisioned infallibility as a gift of the Church which can be exercised by different functional organs: the pope (as specified by Vatican I), the episcopal college (as specified by Vatican II), and even the laity. 21 Examining the contemporary functioning of the sensus fideHum, Murray noted that "the Church's moral consciousness on the question of contraception is in a state of evolution similar to that which took place on the question of usury, against which there were much more explicit scriptural prohibitions and much clearer Church documents."
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In addition to its central teaching on human life and the question of contraception, the publication of Humanae vitae in 1968 focused attention on the papal teaching office and its infallibility. Indirectly and unintentionally, Humanae vitae set the stage for the subsequent infallibility debate.
Almost simultaneously with the issuing of Humanae vitae, Francis Simons, bishop of Indore (India), published Infallibility and the Evidence. 23 Simons, in an effort to update Catholic teaching, had previously attracted attention by challenging many traditional moral absolutes; this time, his target was infallibility. In brief, Simons asserted that the New Testament, particularly the customary proof-texts, cannot provide sufficient historical evidence to claim infallibility for the Church, or for the pope. Although many were attracted by Simons' basic insight-infallibility needs to be reformulated or reinterpreted-his argument was based on such a fundamentalistic approach to Scripture that it was hermeneutically untenable. Thus Simons' denial of infallibility was well noticed, but easily dismissed, in theological circles.
The year after Humanae vitae was published, another book appeared that directly challenged papal authority and infallibility. Francis Oakley's examination of the Great Western Schism showed that the medieval Church did not possess any juridically effective mechanism for correcting papal malpractice; thus the Council of Constance had to fabricate a solution to the schism. Although the procedures of Constance stanched the schism, should they be considered merely pragmatic or do they have 26 Although infalli bility was considered in a variety of perspectives-historical and phenomenological, scriptural and sociological-the major focus of the colloquium papers was philosophical and theological.
For philosophers, the initial question is whether infallibility is a philo sophical possibility at all. Given human finiteness in general, and the human propensity to error in particular, it would seem initially impossible to speak of infallibility in any human context. While it would be simpler to preclude infallibility from the start, there are two phenomena that make such a preemption gratuitous. First, in the persistent quest for truth the human inquirer basically seems to be searching for infallibility; even if this goal is judged impossible, one needs to explain why it seems to be an inherent part of the human search for certitude. Secondly, in their basic tenets all religions seem to be making a claim to infallibility; even if such claims, separately or collectively, are rejected, one needs to explain why all religions apparently make such a claim.
If philosophers cannot avoid encountering the existence of infallibility postulates, their meaning is far from clear. The customary negative definition of infallibility, "immunity from error," is not particularly help ful in specifying what infallibility is. Moreover, a philosopher would want to inquire about the noetic system(s) in which infallibility is presumed to be meaningful. For example, is infallibility a concept that is viable only in a closed system? The problem of meaning emerges with full force when one attempts to predicate infallibility; again, who or what is infallible? Simultaneously, in the process of determining purportedly appropriate ways of predicating infallibility, it would be necessary to construct a verification process that could satisfactorily determine when infallibility is being used correctly. In this regard, particularly in light of later events, it is worth noting that colloquium participants seriously questioned whether it is ever legitimate to describe propositions as infallible.
The philosophical discussion of infallibility was incisive and insightful. In addition to such specific issues as those already mentioned, it became clear that infallibility is not exclusively a Roman Catholic problem but a fundamental religious concern. Accordingly, infallibility needs to be discussed in a much broader perspective than has ordinarily been the case.
Like many similar symposia, the Castelli colloquium resolved few issues. If anything, infallibility appeared even more problematic than before, as if all the questions left hanging at Vatican I had been resuscitated with renewed vigor. Thus the cumulative contribution of the symposium was in the area of raising the right questions; in other words, the participants were remarkably successful in avoiding the false problems that have plagued too many less discerning discussions of infallibility. In this respect the colloquium is one of the relatively few occasions when philosophical issues connected with infallibility have been discussed perceptively rather than polemically. Thus the Castelli colloquium did valuable spadework for a potentially productive reappraisal of infallibility. Unfortunately, this potential has gone largely unrealized; at the same time that the colloquium proceedings were published, the attention of theologians was being mesmerized by a more daring rival.
KUNG VERSUS INFALLIBILITY
If it was possible for theologians easily to dismiss the charges of Oakley and Simons, the work of a well-known and widely influential theologian could hardly be ignored. And if it was difficult to digest the ramifications of the Castelli colloquium, it was far easier to respond to a clearly and concisely formulated case against infallibility. So the publication of Hans Küng's Unfehlbar? immediately stirred the long-simmering difficulties about infallibility into a heated debate.
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Küng's "inquiry" voiced considerable irritation with the retarded pace of postconciliar renewal. The most apparent impediment to renewal was ecclesiastical authoritarianism, especially that of the "Roman system," whose penchant for self-preservation was responsible for Humanae vitae, the most recent of "numerous and indisputable" errors of the ecclesiastical teaching office. 28 The alleged mistakes of the papacy prompted Küng to re-examine the scriptural basis for infallibility: the New Testament was found to guarantee the indefectibility of the Church but not the infallibility of its statements. Thus the papal claim to infallibility must abdicate in favor of an ecclesial assurance of indefectibility.
Küng's questioning of infallibility quickly spawned a far-reaching reaction. Almost immediately, his German-speaking colleagues rose either to attack or to defend; 29 with the appearance of an English translation, American theologians joined the discussion. The result was an avalanche of articles; many reviewers agreed with Küng-at least to some extent. Typically, theologians shared Küng's repudiation of an exaggerated extension of infallibility to any and every kind of papal pronouncement; reviewers also sympathized with Küng's concern for re-examining the scriptural and historical foundations of the doctrine and the concomitant need to revise the customary teaching on infallibility.
It was equally evident, however, that many reviewers who congratulated Küng also had some serious reservations about his work. First, his presentation was colored by an antiauthoritarianism that many found both distracting and distorting. Richard McBrien, for example, remarked that "it seems important that the issue of infallibility should be studied from a perspective larger than the phenomenon of Humanae vitae or even of the crisis of ecclesiastical leadership." 30 Secondly, Küng's presentation suffered from some hermeneutical deficiencies surprising in a theologian of his stature. In particular, his rejection of any scriptural basis for infallibility savored of "biblicist presuppositions" that discounted the difficulty of restating the Christian message and seemed to disallow the possibility of genuine postapostolic doctrinal development. 31 Similarly, Küng's list of "classical errors of the ecclesiastical teaching office" was not as conclusive as purported; 32 if most conceded that the instances cited were mistakes, many simultaneously questioned whether such decisions really involved an exercise of infallibility. 33 In addition, the inter- pretation of infallibility which Küng chose to attack was an ultramontane summary characteristic of many outmoded theological manuals, but one which few theologians after Vatican II care to defend.
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The "infallibility debate" was enormously successful if measured quantitatively by the plethora of publications. Was the debate also profitable qualitatively? In retrospect, it seems that the controversy was overly centered on Küng, whose book, effectively but not always accurately, set the parameters for discussion. On the one hand, Küng's premise-the doctrine of infallibility needs to be re-examined-was undeniably on target. On the other hand, some of Küng's particular charges misfired. For example, Küng's repeated attack on "infallible propositions" is basically a repudiation of a popular misconception of Vatican I; as such, Küng can be credited for demolishing an untenable misinterpretation which certainly deserved destruction. However, Pastor aeternus did not use the expression "infallible propositions" but spoke of "irreformable definitions." Insofar as the former expression is philosophical and theological, and the latter is juridical, Küng's questioning of the former leaves the latter untouched. 35 Thus, by dispensing himself from the task of rigorous textual exegesis, Küng failed to advance the critical understanding of infallibility.
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If Küng's aim was sometimes directed at the wrong targets, his critics frequently followed suit by defending the indefensible. For example, a fair number of Küng's critics sought to legitimize "infallible propositions" again without paying attention to the fact that the Council did not use this expression. Moreover, not only was the "infallibility debate" fought in the wrong places; it was also fought with the wrong weapons. Unfortunately, the polemical pitch of Infallible? was allowed to set the tone for the debate. Küng quickly acquired more opponents than anyone deserves, and sometimes he was treated unfairly. 37 polemics, dialogue was easily replaced by dueling. Küng seems to have realized that positions were stalemated; his "balance sheet" announced that he was turning his attention to more essential issues. 39 If, in retrospect, the "infallibility debate" seems more a polemical digression than a theological contribution, the controversy did highlight two areas that needed further investigation: first, a more precise and detailed history of the origins and development of infallibility; secondly, a systematic philosophical-theological explanation of infallibility.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS: TIERNEY, BANTLE, POTTMEYER
During the decades following Vatican I, proinfallibilist theologians elaborated a convenient historical explanation for the origin and development of infallibility. Like many other subsequently accepted teachings, infallibility was not specifically formulated in the early Church; rather, infallibility is one of those dogmas that were germinally present in apostolic times and gradually unfolded in the postapostolic age. Specifically, if Peter and his earliest successors never explicitly claimed infallibility, still they taught in a way that today would be considered equivalent to an exercise of infallibility.
Latent in this historical approach are two intertwined assumptions. First and fundamental is the supposition that history develops organically; accordingly, the instances of authoritative papal teaching can presumably be plotted in a trajectory that advances towards greater clarity of both exercise and expression. Second and subordinate is the assumption that the pivotal part of the trajectory is in its initial stage; in other words, the doctrine of infallibility can and must be historically verified in the early Church. These assumptions were frequently reinforced by polemical considerations; since many anti-infallibilists charged that infallibility was a recent innovation, Roman Catholic proponents usually produced biblical and patristic "proofs" in defense of infallibility and tended to bypass its medieval and modern development. reluctance, it was accepted by the papacy because it suited the convenience of the popes to accept it.
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The first result, then, of Tierney's research was a documented claim to have determined the precise period in which papal infallibility emerged as an explicit theological position. Simultaneously and surprisingly, Tierney discovered that papal infallibility was not originally the penchant of power-seeking primates, but a strategy to restrict papal authority.
However unexpected these results, their broader implications were even more provocative; Tierney's conclusion directly challenged conventional assumptions about doctrinal development. If papal infallibility is not the fructification of a process of development originating in apostolic times, but a fortuitous medieval invention, then it is "hardly possibleeven allowing for all theories of development of dogma-to maintain that the doctrine of infallibility formed part of a depositum fidei handed down by Christ to the apostles."
42 Tierney, of course, was criticized for overextending his conclusions-not only outside the period of his historical competence but also outside of history into theology. 43 One suspects, however, that such criticism is only superficially fair, methodologically, it seems that an evolutionary interpretation of doctrine is being used to judge an episodic view of history. If so, such criticism begs the latent and unresolved question whether the history of dogma is continuous or disjunctive.
In addition to the question of doctrinal development, Tierney's treatise raised other issues. Outside of recourse to divine providence, neither the medieval nor the modern Church has an effective procedure for dealing with a pope who falls into heresy, much less one who simply errs. 44 In a sense, the medieval discussion about the deposition of an heretical pope has a modern counterpart in the problematic reception of papal doctrinal teaching. seen and unfortunate side effects: a tendency to treat all papal decisions as unquestionably irreformable; a presumption that the task of theologians is simply to explain, but not to examine, papal teachings; a supposition that the acceptance of doctrine is automatic; an ignoring of the process by which church teaching is assimilated.
Tierney's study also challenged Maistre's equation: "Infallibility in the spiritual order and sovereignty in the temporal order are two perfectly synonymous words." 46 Tierney, in contrast, found the terms incompatible: on the one hand, "a sovereign ruler cannot be bound by the acts of his predecessors"; on the other hand, "the infallible decrees of one pope are binding on all his successors, since they are, by definition, irreformable."
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Thus the basic reason for the medieval papacy's rejection of papal infallibility was its implied restriction of papal authority: medieval popes saw papal infallibility as imprisoning them within the confines of their predecessors' decisions. This fundamental incompatibility of sovereignty and infallibility continues to surface: either a pope will feel constrained to reiterate the decisions of his predecessors (as was the option exercised by Paul VI in Humanae vitae), or, should a pope contradict previous papal teaching, it will be necessary to harmonize the two teachings artificially. In the latter case, "theologians, more reprehensibly (from a historian's point of view), have devised hermeneutical principles so ingenious that the documents of the past can never embarrass them." 48 In contrast to Tierney's work, Franz Xaver Bantle's study of the treatment of infallibility by South German Catholic theologians during the last third of the eighteenth century showed that the Church's infallibility was a commonly accepted teaching, and also an occasional topic of polemical preaching. 49 Of particular interest is the ecclesiological framework undergirding this proinfaUibilist ecclesiology. 50 Schematically, the Church was seen as an institution whose teaching is normative in matters of revelation. At its foundation, the apostles presumably received revelation, not only immediately but in its entirety, from Christ; in other words, revelation is construed as an absolute datum, unaffected by the historical situation. Similarly, while this original revelation obviously has to be transmitted in the postapostolic Church, the 46 process is one of logical explicitation, not a real developmental process. Given this framework, it can be confidently claimed that what the contemporary Church teaches is identical with the teaching of the apostles. In this respect infallibility is the divine guarantee that in the process of transmission the literal sense of scriptural revelation is accurately preserved. While the scope of infallibility was variously restricted or extended, these theologians generally agreed that the exercise of the Church's infallibility is vested in the episcopate as a whole. Some, of course, defended a papal exercise as well, but this was considered an open theological question.
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This approach had the advantage of being lucid and logical; as such, it was well suited for the then customary anti-Protestant polemics. But what apparently passed unnoticed was the fact that the ecclesiology was neither biblical nor patristic nor scholastic, but a Counter Reformation offspring. One result of this ancestry, when linked to a literalistic mentality, was the use of scriptural passages as proof-texts divorced from context. Whatever the obvious merits of such an ecclesiology, and of such a view of infallibility in particular, in reaffirming a sense of security among faithful Catholics, this theological construct was ill prepared to meet the challenge of the Enlightenment.
Given the rationalistic mentality of the Enlightenment, it is hardly surprising that a genuine Protestant-Catholic dialogue did not develop. What is revealing, however, is the experience of those Catholic theologians who presumed to raise objections against infallibility: their views were attacked, their writings placed on the Index. 53 At the very least, the Council's history shows some definite parallels with the South German situation. First, some were apparently oblivious to historical criticism and felt that infallibility should be treated "dogmatically, not historically.
,, Similarly, others felt that once the dogma was proclaimed, it was the task of theologians to explain (away) any apparent historical problems. In contrast, some felt that unless and until the doctrine of infallibility was historically demonstrated, it could not reasonably be accepted. Finally, some appear to have managed to balance an awareness of the real historical problems with at least a minimalistic acceptance of the conciliar definition.
Just as Tierney's volume was helpful in pinpointing the emergence of papal infallibility as a theological position, and Bantle's volume was useful in contrasting a regional recognition of ecclesial infallibility with a restricted awareness of its attendant difficulties, the work of Hermann Josef Pottmeyer has been particularly valuable in understanding the rapid rise of ulltramontane ecclesiology in the nineteenth century. 54 At the start of the century, papal infallibility was a "novel idea" insofar as it was a theological opinion, recognized in some quarters but rejected in others. 55 How, then, can one explain the precipitous progress of papal infallibility from denial to dogma in a half-dozen decades? Pottmeyer's 53 The historical events that were most frequently discussed at Vatican I as instances where popes had betrayed their teaching responsibility were the condemnation of the "Three Chapters" by Vigilius, the letter on the "one will of Christ" by Honorius, the brief Pro Armenis of Eugene IV, and the that some participants considered magisterium as basically a teaching power which invites the response of faith, while others construed magisterium as essentially a lawmaking power which requires the response of obedience. Whatever the mentality of the Council fathers, the text of Pastor aeternus displays a commingling of theological and juridical perspectives. For instance, a theological approach is evident in the description of the pope as "enjoying that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer endowed his Church;" a canonical approach surfaces in specifying the conditions necessary for a pope to exercise infallibility: "when discharging the office of pastor and teacher of all Christians, he defines, with his supreme apostolic authority, a doctrine of faith and morals that must be held by the universal Church."
58
The spectre of Maistre appears in other places as well. A striking resemblance to Maistre's concept of absolute sovereignty is found in the Council's ascription of "full and supreme power of jurisdiction" to the pope. 59 Similarly, should one detect Maistre's presence behind the Council's awkward juxtaposition of papal and episcopal jurisdiction or the Council's inability to assign limits to papal power? 60 In some respects Maistre's presence can be sensed today in any absolutist monarchical ecclesiological schema, where judicial competence is more important than the content of the juridical decision; axiomatically, the king can do no wrong. In other words, paramount importance is attached to the extrinsic authority of the judge rather than to the intrinsic merits of the decision. When transferred to ecclesiology, such a view can easily accord supreme importance to the highest decision-maker, particularly when the revelatory data are unclear or disputed. Parenthetically, one might detect this phenomenon in operation on the pre-Vatican II scene when considerable emphasis was placed on any and every type of papal pronouncement. In addition, this emphasis on judicial competence tends to expect a basically passive receptivity to juridical decisions; in contrast, an emphasis on content tends to invite an active process of reception, in winch the recipient is personally responsible for accepting or rejecting the evidence advanced.
If, then, Maistre's absolutism was operative at Vatican I, and afterwards even more influential in ultramontane writings, Vatican II, while professedly continuing in the footsteps of its predecessor, implicitly disowned a monopolistic and nonparticipatory sovereignty with its doctrine of collegiality.
The applicability of Pottmeyer's study is, then, not restricted to the particular problem of the ultramontane elaboration of papal infallibility 58 
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prior to Vatican I. First, his portrait of preconciliar papalism shows considerable plurality; it suggests that the infallibility debate at Vatican I was not only between the majority and the minority but among variegated shades of proinfallibilists as well. Thus the moderate definition that was finally voted by the Council represented a multilateral compromise, which has generally been unacknowledged in most subsequent presentations of infallibility. Moreover, if a spectrum of interpretations was legitimated by the participants at Vatican I, one ought to conclude that a diversity of views on infallibility is still legitimate today. Secondly, Pottmeyer's study suggests that papal infallibility is the keystone of a monarchical ecclesiology based on an absolutist political ideology. With the waning of political absolutism as an appealing option, it is hardly surprising that the collateral ecclesiology has become unattractive. Since the customary presentations of papal infallibility were embedded in a system that is no longer appetible, it is not surprising that some who have discarded a pyramidal ecclesiology also discarded papal infallibility. A more constructive alternative, however, would be to recast infallibility in terms of other models of the Church. Before the Council, many bishops had been irritated by Manning's intemperate writings favoring a definition; during the Council, his suffragans were decidedly embarrassed by their metropolitan's highhanded maneuvering in caucuses and committees; after the Council, the bishops were disconcerted by the archbishop's effort to make everyone else accept his version of the Council's teaching.
Such factors as an English sense of fair play, tolerance for diversity, and reserve about airing intramural disputes before a customarily hostile British public apparently allowed opponents of the definition to work out some modus vivendi with the conciliar decision. Lord Acton, for example, who not only published his opposition to infallibility before the Council and continued expressing his reservations after the doctrine was proclaimed, managed to remain within Roman Catholicism, while his former teacher Döüinger did not. 82 Acton's escape from official censure is particularly interesting, since his opposition to infallibility could hardly be overlooked.
Arriving in Rome shortly before the Council convened, Acton did not content himself with being a bystander bemused by the conciliar pageantry or a host graciously entertaining visiting prelates. 83 Acton quickly became the rallying point of the opposition. An accomplished linguist, Acton was the catalyst who brought anti-infallibilist bishops into contact, though not into concerted action; in spite of his efforts, the opposition was too diverse to become a united force. Some of Acton's expectations were unrealistic; for example, his hope that the exodus of the minority bishops prior to the proclamation of Pastor aeternus could be galvanized into further resistance that would result in a revision or reversal of the conciliar decision proved illusory. After the Council, Acton was abandoned by the minority bishops. support to the anti-infallibilist cause, he was unable to go further, since his own cabinet opposed any official governmental involvement in the Council. A curious addendum to their rather extensive correspondence during Vatican I came a quarter century later when neither Acton nor Gladstone could recall their unsuccessful campaign. 85 An even more checkered result emerged from Acton's correspondence with DöUinger. Furnished with inside information by his ecclesiastical contacts, Acton relayed the latest news about the Council's proceedings to his former professor. Given conciliar secrecy, these reports, published pseudonymously as letters from Quirinus in the Allgemeine Zeitung, had a practical monopoly of the popular press. In the absence of more moderate interpretations of infallibility, Quirinus' Letters from Rome on the Council 86 fomented a widespread anti-infallibilism. Unfortunately, the correspondents seemed unaware that their personal concerns were substantially different: where Acton's anti-infallibilism was historically motivated by his zeal for church reform, DöUinger was theologically opposed to an apparent doctrinal innovation. If Acton could seemingly remain within a church that possibly could be reformed in spite of its claim to infallibility, DöUinger could hardly approve of a church whose teaching was apparently unwarranted. Even more unfortunate, the vignette of infallibility proposed by Acton and publicized by DöUinger helped nourish such anti-Catholic expressions as the Kulturkampf and the No-Popery movements. 87 While Acton's efforts to mobilize opposition were necessarily restricted to extraconciliar activity, within the Councü "perhaps the stiffest opponent" was Peter Richard Kenrick, archbishop of St. Louis. 88 Since Kenrick published two Latin treatises opposing the proposed definition, his theological argumentation during the Councü is readily ascertainable. 89 More conjectural, however, is the origin of Kenrick's anti-infallibilism. Apparently, a mitigated GaUicanism was current at Maynooth when Kenrick was a student there, yet the extent of such "seminary influence" in shaping his subsequent conciliar position seems impossible to verify. 90 
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THEOLOGICAL STUDIES not only proved unsympathetic but quickly demanded their formal subscription to the conciliar decision. There followed a protracted period of negotiations in which professorial responses and archiépiscopal expectations never quite managed to match. Eventually a standoff ensued when ecclesiastical procedures against the priest-professors were checkmated by university statutes. On the one hand, the priests were deprived of their sacerdotal functions and excommunicated; on the other hand, they were supported by their professorial colleagues and sustained in their teaching positions by the Prussian government.
One can regret that the ecclesiastical proceedings evidenced more juridical exactitude than appreciation of theological difficulties; one can also regret that the priest-professors chose the dually dubious route of encouraging a schismatic movement and seeking support from an antiCatholic government. But the true tragedy, as the archival research of the late August Franzen has poignantly proved, 95 was that the alienation of the Bonn faculty members was entirely unnecessary. In the course of their negotiations with their archbishop, the Bonn professors presented several letters of submission whose formulations were rejected as inadequate. What was unknown to both sides was that similar, and even more mitigated, formulae had been judged acceptable elsewhere-Rome included.
Unfortunately, the Bonn scenario had a counterpart at Munich, where DöUinger, who was all too well informed of the ultramontane maneuvers at the Council, seems to have been unaware of the more moderate interpretations of Pastor aeternus.
... Döllinger, agitated and in conflict with the "maximal infallibilists," did not understand the actions of the Council. Had Archbishop Scherr not pushed him for an early submission, Döüinger's own logic that a council becomes ecumenical when it is accepted by the episcopacy throughout the world would probably have led him to accept its decisions and to reevaluate his own.... cusable, the similarly rigorous interpretation of Archbishop Manning of Westminster borders on the unconscionable. Although one suspects that Manning, the "majority whip" at Vatican I, must have realized that Pastor aeternus was not quite the victory for which he had worked, still he was never so indiscreet as to acknowledge the legitimacy of interpretations more moderate than his own.
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A similar stance was evidenced by Ignaz von Senestrey, bishop of Regensburg and Manning's alter ego in their joint vow to do all in their power to achieve the definition of infallibility. Unfortunately, as Senestrey's recently published diary reveals," their use of power bordered on the paranoid. Not only was the minority's concern about the opportuneness of the definition construed as obstructionism, the minority's theological problems were viewed as a devious plot to debilitate in advance any definition that might be adopted. In fact, Senestrey was so determined to fulfil his vow that he did not hesitate to manipulate those prelates whose devotion to infallibility did not equal his. Although intraconciliar politics was inevitable, Manning and Senestrey appear to have operated behind the scenes as if they were deeply afraid of embarrassment should their efforts prove unsuccessful. Similarly, after the Council, their elaborate pretensions of success seem characteristic of the person whose victory is flawed.
Another source that reveals the inner workings of the hyperultramontane mind is the diary attributed to Giovanni Franco, a staff member of Civiltà cattolica}™ Although Civiltà was generally considered to be not only the house organ of the Roman Jesuits but also the unofficial voice of Pius IX, the diary shows that the Civiltà Jesuits were surprisingly suspicious of their more moderate confreres, including their own superior general. And while the Pope appreciated the publication's unswerving support, occasionally its endeavors inadvertently ran counter to his desires. The most revealing aspect of this diary, however, is its apocalyptic depiction of Vatican I as a battleground between the forces of good and those of evil; assuming a self-righteous role as papal champion, the Civiltà staff was not above employing the same type of intrigue and manipulation for which it eloquently reproached its opponents. Regrettably, the diary entries end with the proclamation of infallibility. It would be interesting to know whether the Civiltà staff was really content with speaking, but not really of influencing either the course of the Council or the preparation of its decrees. When some opposition prelates objected, pressure was brought to bear by delaying requests for faculties and by utilizing the surveillance and censorship of the papal police. Against such manipulative machinery, the minority bishops could strut and fret on the conciliar stage without being able to influence the decision that had been so well planned in advance. When some anti-infallibilist bishops proved recalcitrant by leaving the Council before the final ballot, the Curia rose to the occasion by demanding of each absent bishop a written submission to the conciliar decrees. Simultaneously, with the Council prorogued sine die, the opposition was separated and unable to act in concert. Individual bishops then were brought around by a judicious combination of withholding and granting privileges, along with a few exemplary resignations and reassignments. With the opposition reduced to the limited numbers of the Old Catholic movement, the Curia was able to attend to one remaining task, an orchestrated history of the Council, which was promoted by allowing only ultramontane historians access to archival records, which were simultaneously purged of any compromising material.
Hasler's well-documented presentation has the verve of an accomplished raconteur who knows when to season his tidbits with a dash of ecclesiastical gossip. However, a closer look at his sources reveals a prejudiced pattern. Preference on the whole is given to anti-infallibilist writers. Next, there is little critical evaluation of these sources, so that what later was proved to be rumor seems to be accounted as fact. Thirdly, the majority bishops are caricatured by regularly presenting the views of the most ultramontane as if they were representative of all proinfallibilists; simultaneously, the actions of the anti-infallibilists are appraised sympathetically, when they sometimes deserved censure. Inadvertently, a number of Hasler's findings seem to work against the thrust of his thesis. For example, if there really was considerable anti-infallibilist sentiment in the Curia, one needs to explain why this curial opposition did not aid the anti-infallibilist bishops; after all, it is not impossible for the Curia to frustrate papal intentions. Again, if Pius IX was as infirm and irresponsible as Hasler has suggested, it is hard simultaneously to picture him as masterminding the Council; moreover, Hasler's portrait of Pius IX has heavy shadings of Nordic disdain for Mediterranean volatility. Further, if the Council really was rigged in advance, one wonders why the ultramontanes were apparently afraid of the opposition; perhaps the minority bishops were more politically astute than Hasler might lead one to believe.
The discrepancies and inconsistencies in Hasler's historical account strongly suggest that the data has been adroitly arranged to fit the thesis. Similarly, his treatment of the theological debate at the Council displays both obvious strengths and definite disabilities. On the floor of the Council, numerous texts from Scripture and patristic writings and dozens of cases from conciliar and papal history were discussed; thus, Hasler's catalogue of these arguments is extremely helpful. An examination of these arguments indicates that the majority bishops accepted these "proof-texts" as an indication that the infallibility of the pope, though expressed in different ways, had always been believed; thus the proposed definition should be viewed as a clarification of a traditional belief. In contrast, the minority felt that these texts simply did not substantiate what was claimed; moreover, not only did their requests for historical proof remain unanswered, but, as Hasler has rightly emphasized, recent research shows that the anti-infallibilist objections in this respect are unanswerable.
In harmony with his leitmotiv, Hasler has judged that the conciliar discussions were more ritual than reality; the minority was allowed to voice its objections to preserve the façade of freedom, but there was no essential development as a result of the debate. Such a judgment, however, does not give sufficient weight to two aspects. First, the text of Pastor aeternus was hammered out during the course of the debate; it seems unrealistic to describe this process of revision as exclusively an intramural ultramontane enterprise. Accordingly, while the minority certainly did not like the final version, can it also be said that the minority did not influence the textual wording? Secondly, the lack of substantive dialogue between the majority and the minority may stem from the conflict between two quite different mentalities: at least some of the majority felt that infallibility should be treated systematically, not historically; in contrast, some of the minority felt that without historical evidence no doctrine could be systematically presented. One might find it instructive to explore this methodological conflict, which may shed further light not only on the debate at Vatican I but also on its current counterpart.
Finally, while it is certainly regrettable that the way in which the Curia went about obtaining the submission of the anti-infallibilist bishops was generally supercilious and occasionally vindictive, one need not share Hasler's conclusion that this process was the final step in the dogmatization of an ideology. Although after the Council some of the opposition bishops seem to have conveniently changed the rationale for their opposition from anti-infallibilism to inopportunism, those with serious theological difficulties seem to have come to an acceptance of Pastor aeternus through two other routes: interpretation or obedience. First, quite soon after the Council, it became evident that different majority bishops were interpreting Pastor aeternus in different ways; some minority bishops followed suit by interpreting the definition as minimalistically as possible.
Secondly, some minority bishops were led to accept Pastor aeternus by distinguishing between external obedience and inner faith. While this distinction at first sight seems to be a semantic subterfuge, it corresponds to the intertwining of theological and canonical vocabulary within the decree. 104 Since the minority bishops had no difficulty in assenting internally to the infallibility of the Church, apparently some came around to accepting its exercise by the pope as a matter of juridical obedience.
Both interpretation and obedience have important implications for the ecclesial reception of infallibility but need further consideration and clarification, If the bishops who defined the doctrine also accepted a spectrum of interpretations of its meaning, presumably an analogous plurality is equally legitimate today. Such a spectrum, unfortunately, has not always been recognized. In the past, maximalistic interpretations largely prevailed, and sometimes became exclusive standards; more recently, when maximalism has become untenable, it has been tempting to reject the doctrine of infallibility as well. In effect, those who wish to defend-or to discard-a univocal view of infallibility have failed to appreciate the reception of a conciliar definition as an ecclesial hermeneutical process. In particular, if it is true that Pastor aeternus fuses credal and canonical language, then there is both a mixing of the areas of authority and education and a conflation of the anticipated responses: obeying and assenting. The inadequate differentiation of credal and canonical language, while providing some anti-infallibilist bishops with a convenient escape hatch, seems to have produced considerable confusion in the current debate. history of various doctrines, Chirico has opted to consider the topic by examining "the generic processes by which modern men at different levels of development and in different cultures come to definitive understanding of the faith."
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In this anthropological approach to the topic, the first issue is whether infallibility is humanly possible. For Chirico, the possibility of infallibility is grounded in "universal meanings" that are available in human experience; a "universal meaning" is "meaning that exists or can exist as a moment of legitimate and necessary human development in every person of every age and culture." 107 The case for universal meanings is based on the facts of human communication and historical understanding; without universal meanings people would be unable either to communicate with one another or to understand the past. These universal meanings on the human level have a religious counterpart: "universal Christian meanings," also called "dogmatic meanings." These latter are meanings which have been achieved in Christ and which are demanded of all people at least as a goal and, if possible, as an achievement. The basic dogmatic meaning is the "acceptance of the universal presence and activity of the risen Christ"; 108 other dogmatic meanings are presumed to be in an intrinsic relationship with, and thus derivations of, Christ's resurrection. Accordingly, Christian doctrine should not be treated as a set of propositions but as an organic whole which is progressively thematized through a cumulative process of understanding within the Christian community.
The second phase of Chirico's work is simultaneously a testing of the applicability of his hypothesis to the Church's teaching on infallibility and an attempt to supply for the notable deficiencies of previous theological presentations on the topic. Specifically, infallibility is categorized as a personal quality which is defined and limited by an individual's selfawareness; "infallible judgments"are those whose "denial would be tantamount to the denial of the subject's awareness of himself." 109 Correspondingly, ecclesial infallibility is centered on the Church's recognition of the Resurrection: "Only that aspect of Christ's risen humanity which is universally graspable can be understood with any certainty by men; and it is this universal aspect that can be expressed in dogmatic statements."
110 Since infallibility is a gift bestowed for articulating the core of the Church's resurrectional faith, it is inadequate merely to describe the conditions for exercising infallibility in juridical terms, as has been the fashion since Vatican I. Moreover, since infallibility involves the Church's self-awareness, "there is an acceptable Roman Catholic sense in which 106 
